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High levels of  poverty and inequality persist in democratic 
South Africa despite a decade of  government policies and 
budgetary realignments designed to address the legacies of  
apartheid and steady economic growth. Some policies have 
been relatively successful: access by the poor to clean water, 
electricity and sanitation has improved dramatically, and 
increased numbers receive social grants. But South Africa 
has the second highest level of  inequality in the world after 
Brazil, and the gap between the rich and the poor appears to 
be widening. 
It is increasingly clear that growth alone will not reduce 
poverty and inequality, and that improved social services and 
grants do not address the fundamental problem: entrenched 
structural features of  the economy. Government is now 
developing policies aimed at transferring resources to ‘the 
marginalised’, through expanded public works programmes, 
micro-credit for entrepreneurs, skills development and 
agrarian reform. 
For some analysts a key problem is the absence of  formal 
property rights to the assets owned by the poor. A recent 
African National Congress discussion document suggests 
that failure to provide title deeds to land and houses ‘sterilises 
the enormous value of  these existing assets, which could so 
easily be turned into collateral to secure access to capital’. 
Government’s new housing policy document Breaking new 
ground complains that the 1.6 million new houses funded by 
the state since 1994 have not become ‘valuable assets’ for 
the poor, and emphasises improved access to title deeds as a 
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means to helping the poor participate in residential property 
markets. These examples demonstrate the increasing influence 
of  Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto and his book The 
mystery of  capital (2000).
De Soto offers a simple yet beguiling message: capitalism 
can be made to work for the poor, through formalising 
their property rights in houses, land and small businesses. 
This approach resonates strongly in the South African 
context, where private property is dominant and works well 
for those who inhabit the so-called ‘first economy’. At the 
same time, international support for de Soto’s ideas appears 
to be increasing. A High-level Commission on the Legal 
Empowerment of  the Poor was launched this month, hosted 
by the United Nations Development Programme, and co-
chaired by de Soto. 
This initiative is also, however, generating strong 
opposition from NGOs, social movements and bodies such 
as the International Land Coalition, which contest the single-
minded focus on individual title, formalisation and credit as 
solutions to poverty (www.desotowatch.net). This policy brief  
analyses evidence from South Africa which suggests that 
many of  de Soto’s policy prescriptions may be inappropriate 
for the poorest and most vulnerable in our society, and have 
negative rather than positive impacts on their security and 
well-being. 
Bringing ‘dead capital’ back to life
The mystery of  capital is a call for a global reform aimed at 
overcoming poverty and underdevelopment. Its focus is 
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formal recognition of  ‘extra-legal’ property. De Soto argues 
that the poor of  the world living in shantytowns and backward 
rural areas hold assets worth trillions of  dollars in the form 
of  houses, buildings, land and small businesses. The problem 
is that their rights are not adequately documented, and hence 
‘these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be 
traded outside of  narrow local circles…, cannot be used as 
collateral for a loan and cannot be used as a share against 
an investment’. Existing legal and administrative systems to 
register property or set up a business are bureaucratic and 
time-consuming and create insuperable barriers to the formal 
recognition of  property rights. As a result the assets of  the 
poor are ‘dead capital’.
In the West, by contrast, ‘the mysteries of  capital’ have 
been solved; every building and every piece of  land and 
equipment is represented in a document and is part of  a ‘vast 
hidden process that connects all these assets to the rest of  
the economy’ injecting life into these assets so they become 
capital, with the potential to create additional value. Assets are 
used as collateral for credit and for the creation of  securities 
and secondary markets, but also provide an ‘accountable 
address’ for the collection of  debts and taxes (and thus a firm 
basis for public services utilities). Formalising property has 
effects that allow its owners to create capital – for example, it 
makes assets fungible, so they can be used for other purposes, 
divisible (in the form of  shares), and combinable (in new 
business enterprises). What is required, therefore, across the 
developing world is a programme to ‘capitalise the poor’ by 
legalising their extra-legal property.
Extra-legal property systems, says de Soto, are not 
chaotic; rather, they are based on local agreements and 
detailed understandings of  who owns what, a localised ‘social 
contract’. But these rules are not codified or standardised and 
cannot be applied outside of  their area of  origin, and local 
systems must therefore be ‘re-engineered’ into one national, 
formal property social contract. This involves the reform of  
existing legal and administrative systems to accommodate 
‘extra-legal’ property, and the creation of  a single, integrated 
regulatory framework. 
What de Soto’s critics say
De Soto’s ideas have mesmerised many policy makers and 
politicians, but a significant body of  scholars and land reform 
practitioners are concerned that his policy prescriptions are 
highly misleading.
The central criticisms revolve around his over-
simplification of  the informal economy and associated 
property relations. Although de Soto does not explicitly 
state that ‘formal property’ is equivalent to individual, private 
property, this is clearly his assumption. He does not adequately 
acknowledge that titling programmes have been tried (at huge 
cost) all over the developing world and failed to produce the 
results he predicts; in fact many titling schemes have been 
shown to disadvantage the poor. He also fails to acknowledge 
the rather different principles that often inform the ‘extra-
legal’ property systems found in rural areas and informal 
settlements. The challenges in how the legal system should 
be adjusted to ‘accommodate’ other property systems, and 
the unsettling implications for mainstream property systems, 
are skirted, not confronted. Although he rightly advocates 
the ‘adjustment’ of  dominant frameworks to accommodate 
‘extra-legal’ property and to create a bridge between the 
legal and the ‘extra-legal’, in reality his policies boil down to 
converting informal property into private property through 
systematic titling.
Secondly, for property to function as capital there must 
be a market for it, allowing it to be used as collateral for 
credit by banks and other lenders. Yet experience shows that 
formal rights are not sufficient to generate a market in land 
or housing, for example, where home owners value secure 
occupation over other functions, and localised practices 
protect poor people’s occupation. In these situations, critics 
argue, other types of  tenure than exclusive private property 
remain more secure and certain for the poor. Where property 
markets do emerge, research has shown that the credit effect 
can fail to materialise, for example, when prices are too low 
for banks to justify the risk.
Other related criticisms include:
 The focus is largely on urban realities and the complexity 
of  rural property regimes (for example, the prevalence of  
common property resource use) is not acknowledged.
 The poor and the ‘extra-legal’ sector are portrayed 
as homogeneous, whereas in reality they are highly 
differentiated – some of  the poor are entrepreneurs, but 
others are landless rural workers who own virtually no 
assets at all.
 The ‘extra-legal’ sector includes businesses that make 
fortunes from the exploitation of  workers because they 
operate outside the law.
 Only the capital-formation function of  property is 
acknowledged and other functions such as securing 
livelihoods or underpinning social identity are ignored.
 Large areas of  land occupied by the poor are already 
owned (for example, by private landlords or the state) – the 
question of  redistribution of  this land is not discussed.
 In many countries the state is the owner of  key economic 
resources such as timber, minerals, energy resources and 
wilderness areas. The distribution of  benefits from these 
resources is a key political issue not considered by de 
Soto.
 De Soto’s account of  the development of  capitalism in 
the USA and Europe is over-simplified and misleading.
Securing property rights in post-
apartheid South Africa
A key legacy of  apartheid was weak and insecure property 
rights for black South Africans, in both urban and rural 
contexts. About two million households live in informal 
settlements or in backyard shacks, and in rural areas at least 
2.5 million households hold land in terms of  ‘communal 
tenure’ regimes. Many new policies have been put in place 
since 1994 to address the problem, including the abolition of  
all racially-based legislation, amendments to existing laws, and 
ambitious land reform and housing laws and programmes.
Two contrasting approaches to securing property rights 
underlie these new policies and laws. The first is to open up the 
world of  private property for those people who were denied 
access to it under the discriminatory regimes of  the past. 
Thus beneficiaries of  state-funded housing are entitled to full 
private ownership and registered title deeds, and land reform 
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beneficiaries can own land individually or collectively. The 
second approach is to secure people’s rights of  occupation 
and use without conferring ownership, including occupation 
of  land owned by others (for example, commercial farms, or 
state land). This qualifies and constrains the ‘absolute’ rights 
of  private ownership.
Government has also attempted an ambitious re-
engineering of  policies, laws and institutional frameworks in 
relation to land use, land management, development planning 
and service delivery (Kingwill 2005). These generally assume 
that surveyed land parcels will be privately used, owned and 
registered (see Box 1).
Evidence from South Africa: two case 
studies 
Joe Slovo Park, Cape Town
In 1990 a group of  households occupied part of  Marconi 
Beam, a well-located vacant piece of  land in Cape Town 
owned by a parastatal company. The area was then declared 
a temporary ‘transit’ area. After years of  negotiation, the Joe 
Slovo Park housing project was implemented in 1997–1998, 
adjacent to the informal settlement. The project built 936 
houses, using the housing subsidy worth R15 000 per 
beneficiary (Smit 2000).
In line with national policy, the form of  tenure granted was 
individual ownership. However, for many people there was 
a decrease in security of  tenure. Ownership was registered 
in the name of  only one member of  each household, often 
resulting in reduced security for women and members of  the 
extended family. Also, the allocation process was biased: some 
long-standing residents were never allocated houses, while 
community leaders allegedly received more than one house. 
The new property owners also became liable for paying 
rates and service charges, then around R200 per month. 
Many were unable to afford this, although the situation has 
subsequently improved with the introduction of  rebates. Five 
years after the project was completed, it was estimated that 
about 30% of  the new houses had been sold, generally for 
between R5 000 and R8 000 (Jacobsen 2003). Almost all sales 
of  properties were informal, and the formal land registration 
system had broken down. People who legally owned houses 
were sometimes unable to occupy them, as street committees 
had decided who should be the occupier, and in some cases 
houses had been rented out by people who did not own 
them. 
Some socio-economic impacts have been negative. 
Informal economic activities have been displaced (and 
sometimes relocated to nearby informal settlements). Social 
networks were disrupted as the allocation of  plots ignored 
kinship ties and social networks. The small size of  the houses 
also meant that landlords were unable to accommodate 
extended family members or tenants, upon whom the 
landlords had relied for rental income (Yose 1999).
The Joe Slovo Park case reveals that individual ownership 
can sometimes result in a decrease in de facto security of  
tenure and a negative impact on socio-economic status. It 
provides clear evidence of  processes of  informal re-sale and 
‘reversion’ to informality. From a policy perspective, it shows 
that intervention must differentiate ‘the poor’ in terms of  
affordability/income and vulnerability; allocation processes 
must be fair and transparent; and livelihood strategies must 
be accommodated.
Ekuthuleni, KwaZulu-Natal
Ekuthuleni is a rural community of  224 households in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Residents currently live on state-registered 
land that they wish to formally acquire through land reform 
and hold in collective ownership, and also receive the benefits 
of  public and private services. The community includes 
farmers operating at different scales, from those engaged in 
small-scale fruit and crop production on a hectare or less to 
forestry farmers on 5–10 hectares. Most families, however, 
survive on welfare grants, and supplement these with 
subsistence agriculture and natural resources harvested from 
the commons. Elderly women head many of  these families. 
Community members say they want to hold land in common 
because ‘we must have some group control here to prevent 
strangers from coming in and causing conflicts’, and because 
‘we cannot afford the costs of  maintaining individual title’. 
Ekuthuleni clearly reveals the limitations of  the dominant 
system of  property rights. This requires three criteria to be 
met before rights can be registered: an individual rights holder 
must be identified; the exclusive rights of  this rights holder 
must be precisely described; and the boundaries of  land 
parcels must be accurately depicted through beaconing and 
geo-referencing. 
But in Ekuthuleni property ownership is never exclusive 
to one person. It is always shared by a number of  family 
members – those living now, some who are deceased and 
some yet to be born. This is a concept that South African 
property law cannot easily accommodate. The closest current 
law can come to doing so is through establishing a family 
trust. Analysis of  this option indicates it is inappropriate to 
the needs of  people at Ekuthuleni: it does not capture the 
nature, content and governance of  family and community-
based land rights. There are many nuanced layers of  rights in 
Ekuthuleni (of  access, use, transactions and decision-making) 
and it would be extremely difficult to precisely describe these 
in title deeds.
In relation to boundaries, people continuously adapt their 
land boundaries to fit social needs such as the temporary 
residence of  a relative in distress or the resolution of  
conflicts over who has what rights. Boundaries are flexible 
and adaptable in the interests of  social harmony, in a context 
where land provides access to vitally important livelihood 
resources.  
The Ekuthuleni case reveals that there is often 
a fundamental incompatibility between property rights in 
community-based systems and the requirements of  formal 
property. Formalisation of  property rights is therefore 
not neutral with respect to existing rights; it does and will 
transform and alter both the nature of  the rights and the 
social relations and identities that underlie them.
In both urban settlements and rural communities there 
is the additional problem that their ‘extra-legal’ property 
rights do not fit the assumptions of  mainstream systems of  
planning, service delivery and land management. This makes 
it difficult for them to benefit from planned development (see 
Box 1).
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Evidence from other studies
A growing number of  studies suggest that the key features 
and processes found in Joe Slovo Park and Ekuthuleni are 
typical of  wider realities in urban and rural South Africa. 
Mongwe (2004) finds that transactions in land and housing 
in informal settlements in Cape Town are socially embedded 
and that social relations and livelihood security are the key to 
understanding tenure dynamics. Cross (1994) suggests that in 
the Durban area ‘urban informal tenure is a system of  relative 
rights, which differs in its underlying conceptualisation from 
private tenure’.
A recent study of  township property (Finmark 2004) 
found a weak secondary market for houses. The majority 
of  homeowners were not interested in a formal sale because 
their incomes were too low to move up the housing ladder, 
and most viewed their homes as a family asset rather than 
as ‘capital’. Over 90% of  respondents felt reasonably secure, 
even without title deeds. None of  those who operated 
enterprises from their homes had a mortgage in the name of  
the business. Tomlinson (2005) suggests that the study reveals 
that a strong focus on title deeds is inappropriate, given the 
real constraints of  affordability and the limited availability of  
housing stock.
Studies in rural areas show that rights to land and natural 
resources are socially and culturally embedded, and nested 
within social and political units operating at different scales. 
Shared and relative rights are characteristic of  most communal 
areas (Alcock & Hornby 2004; Cousins 2005). Most people 
enjoy de facto security of  tenure, but their rights can be 
vulnerable to abuse by both traditional authorities and elected 
bodies. Access to services and infrastructure is constrained by 
lack of  formal recognition of  property rights. The strongest 
demand on the ground is for security of  rights of  families 
and individuals, within a system that secures access to shared 
resources (Claassens 2003). 
De Soto and the South African context
South African experience and evidence suggests many of  
de Soto’s arguments do not hold water, although he rightly 
identifies weaknesses in the way current legal and ‘extra-legal’ 
systems limit poor people’s access to resources:
 Formalisation of  property rights through titling does not necessarily 
promote increased tenure security or certainty and in many cases 
does the opposite.
 Formalisation of  property rights does not promote lending to the poor: 
The assertion that title to property will open up access to 
bank credit is not borne out – banks do not lend to the 
poor because of  the high risk of  non-repayment, the low 
value of  their assets, and relatively high transaction costs. 
Households earning less than around R3 500 per month 
are unlikely to get access to formal credit using land or 
housing as collateral, whether or not they hold title deeds 
to their homes and land. 
 Rather than giving their property the character of  ‘capital’, 
formalisation could expose the poor to the risk of  homelessness: If  
banks could be persuaded to lend to the poor with their 
assets as collateral, foreclosure of  loans would result in 
repossession. Poor households understand this. 
 The urban and rural poor already have some access to credit, 
through informal mechanisms such as loans from family 
members. They try to avoid creating a long-term debt 
burden, and are averse to forms of  borrowing that 
might lead to loss of  important assets. Entrepreneurs do, 
however, want improved access to medium-sized loans for 
which informal credit is unsatisfactory.
 Formalisation through registered title deeds creates unaffordable costs 
for many poor people: registered properties become subject 
to building regulations, boundaries must be surveyed, 
services must be paid for, and rates must be paid to local 
government.
 Informal property systems currently support a robust rental market 
that is well-suited to the needs of  the poor. It is estimated that 
78% of  tenants in informal rental units earn less than 
R1 500 per month (Shisaka 2003). Formalisation, by 
pushing up costs, could impact negatively on this market.
 Formalisation via title deeds for individual property can very quickly 
fail to reflect reality. Many ‘extra-legal’ land tenures defy 
Box 1: Planning, land management and the 
modern cadastre
Property systems are embedded in many institutional 
arrangements, not only in registers. Registers are thus 
only one component of  the formal system, and it is 
the system as a whole that makes property ‘visible’, 
manageable and exchangeable in the eyes of  public 
and private investors and service providers. The act of  
registration is the culmination of  a number of  processes 
that feed into the registration system. Formal planning, 
surveying and conveyancing are highly specialised sets 
of  activities that prepare property for registration and 
maintain its technical and legal integrity. 
There is a close correlation between the 
registration system and the land use management 
system (for example, planning and zoning laws) and 
service delivery systems. Governments are playing an 
increasingly active role in regulating patterns of  land 
use as part of  a larger effort to direct the course of  
economic change. For centralised property registration 
to be sustainable, all these elements have to work in 
tandem and all aspects require approval from society 
at large. 
Property does not become private property by 
the mere entry of  a name in a register or by surveying 
boundaries and preparing formal plans. These 
technical processes are the visible elements of  norms 
and values around property. Without social consensus 
around these, the activities that ostensibly convert 
property into legalised private property may reflect the 
state’s desire to control and manage land more than 
they reflect people’s lived experiences, practices and 
beliefs around property.
The coherence of  the formal land management 
system as a whole is sustained by the concept and 
practice of  land ‘parcelisation’, that is, the notion that 
for each delineated property, there is a corresponding 
and current owner (individual, corporate or state). The 
modern cadastre has thus become a multi-purpose 
instrument serving many purposes. 
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parcelisation into individual estates governed by principles 
of  exclusive access and control. Registers based on these 
assumptions quickly become outdated; similarly, land-use 
plans that do not reflect practice on the ground become 
meaningless.
 ‘The poor’ are not homogeneous and those in the extra-legal sector 
should be differentiated according to income and vulnerability 
status. Formalisation via title deeds may be affordable and 
appropriate for some, especially those who are upwardly 
mobile, but can have negative impacts on the security and 
well-being of  the unemployed and other marginalised 
groupings. 
This analysis suggests that key elements of  de Soto’s 
arguments have limited use in South African context. Rather 
than being a ‘silver bullet’ for poverty reduction, formalisation 
of  property rights within dominant legal and administrative 
frameworks is relevant only for those already on the way out 
of  poverty. Innovations by government and the private sector 
in relation to low-cost methods of  property titling and micro-
credit schemes are welcome and should be encouraged, but 
these have clear limits.
Alternative approaches
For many rural and urban households, the lack of  legal 
recognition of  their property rights can result in insecurity 
of  tenure and can also hamper development. Laws and 
policies to promote higher levels of  tenure security and 
promote investment and development are thus required. 
If  formalisation via integration into the existing system 
of  private property is not the answer for large numbers of  
people, then what is?
Much more attention should be paid to supporting existing 
social practices that have widespread legitimacy, rather than 
expensive solutions that try to replace them. Some features 
of  ‘extra-legal’ property regimes found in South Africa’s 
informal settlements and communal areas provide a key to 
the solutions: for example, their social embeddedness; the 
importance of  land and housing as assets that help to secure 
livelihoods; the layered and relative nature of  rights; and, in 
some rural contexts, the flexible character of  boundaries. 
Approaches based on Western property regimes fail to 
acknowledge and respond to these features, and can lead to 
distortions that impact negatively on the poor – even when 
this occurs within streamlined, more efficient and lower-
cost administrative systems. The risks of  damage are thus as 
important as the risks of  failure. 
Secondly, more attention should be focused on the 
complex relationship between property rights, development 
and state investment and administration. In many developing 
countries the state lacks the capacity to provide the poor 
with formal housing and associated infrastructure and 
services, and indications are that the problem is increasing 
exponentially. Attempts to address the problem through 
‘once-off ’ solutions involving high levels of  state investment, 
such as systematic formalisation of  property rights, need 
to give way to a more nuanced, incremental and integrated 
development approach. Such an approach would seek to 
extend infrastructure, services and economic opportunity 
– linked to legal recognition of  diverse tenure forms – but 
without the necessity of  imposing a country-wide property 
cadastre in the first place.
Thirdly, the enormous inequities in property ownership 
inherited from the apartheid era remain a fundamental 
constraint on the livelihoods of  the poor. Poverty reduction 
policies must therefore include a central focus on large-scale 
programmes of  redistribution. The snail’s pace of  current 
land redistribution efforts is not politically sustainable; new 
policies are urgently needed and may now be in the pipeline.
 Fourthly, land reform laws such as the Extension of  
Security of  Tenure Act and the Land Reform (Labour 
Tenants) Act, that seek to secure the rights of  occupiers 
without necessarily transferring full ownership to them, 
remain important but are proving inadequate in their present 
form. Research indicates that nearly a million farm dwellers 
have been evicted in the decade since 1994 (Wegerif  et al. 
2005). Property rights of  people on farms thus need to be 
strengthened and government needs to allocate resources for 
their protection. Similar arguments can be made for people 
subject to ongoing evictions from urban and peri-urban 
land.
For these suggestions to take root, reform of  the 
dominant legal and administrative frameworks for holding 
and regulating property are urgently required, so that the 
principles that govern ‘extra-legal’ property in rural and urban 
informal settlements, and which often emerge within land 
reform projects, can receive legal recognition and practical 
support. This is the major focus of  tenure reform initiatives 
currently being undertaken across Africa, Latin America and 
Asia. South Africans can learn from these.
The focus in de Soto’s writings on only one element 
of  property (legalisation), belies the multi-faceted nature 
of  property in any given society (see Box 1). This suggests 
that tenure reform requires a more rigorous and far-reaching 
approach than the term ‘formalisation’ implies. The entire 
legal and social complex around which notions of  formal and 
informal property are constituted needs to be interrogated.
It is indeed unfortunate that de Soto offers no examples of  
what might practically be involved in his positive suggestion 
that dominant frameworks need ‘adjustment’ to accommodate 
‘extra-legal’ property, in order to build a bridge between the 
legal and the ‘extra-legal’. In his work there is very little 
indication of  what modifications to the core characteristics of  
the system of  private property-as-capital would be required 
to accommodate the systems of  the poor sectors of  society. 
Despite the understanding he demonstrates of  the workings 
of  the extra-legal property systems and of  localised ‘social 
contracts’, his focus remains integration within current legal 
frameworks. 
The many interesting and important innovations in tenure 
reform that are under way across the developing world receive 
scant attention from de Soto, yet it is these that provide 
pointers for the future.
Conclusion
Policy makers must resist the temptation to seek simplistic 
solutions to poverty of  the kind offered by de Soto. Poverty 
reduction efforts of  the scale required in South Africa and 
elsewhere require a great deal more than the securing of  
property rights in the manner prescribed. Tenure reform 
remains necessary and important, but is far from sufficient. 
In addition, it must be recognised that restructuring the 
Page 6 PLAAS POLICY BRIEF NO.18   OCTOBER 2005
dominant frameworks of  property law and administration, so 
that they work to support the interests of  the poor, is no easy 
task. We must build a better understanding of  the complexity 
of  multiple, informal tenures within the ‘extra-legal’ sector, 
in all their diversity, and acknowledge at the outset that they 
are fundamentally different to the individualised, exclusive, 
private property systems of  Western capitalism. 
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